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punishment would be achieved by denying such a person the use
of the highways and thus sparing innocent victims in the first
place. But, however desirable, such a law would be indeed difficult
to contrive.
RICHARD L. BURROWS
Investment Company Act-Procedure--Demand on Shareholders
The Investment Company Act of 1940' is a statutory attempt
to regulate the internal structure and business conduct of investment companies. It specifically authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to investigate violations,2 issue orders,3 and
seek injunctions. 4 A private right of action by the shareholder is not
specifically authorized. The case of Levitt v. Johnson5 faced squarely
for the first time the problem of the source of the law to be applied
in a private suit under the act.
'54 Stat. 789, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1958), as amended,
15 U.S.C. § 80a (Supp. V, 1963).
2

54 Stat. 842 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).

54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-37 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-39 (1958).
' 54 Stat. 841 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1958); 54 Stat. 842 (1940),
15 U.S.C. § 80a-41 (1958).
334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964), reversing 222 F. Supp. 805 (D. Mass.
1963). The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, brought a derivative suit under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, against the directors of the Fidelity
Capital Fund, Inc., a Massachusetts corporation, on behalf of himself and
other stockholders. The allegations generally were that the directors had
paid excessive fees that constituted a waste of corporate assets. As to the
condition precedent of making a demand on shareholders, the plaintiff alleged
as excuse for failure to make demand that
the Fund has more than 48,000 stockholders scattered all over the United
States whose identity is subject to frequent changes. A demand upon
the stockholders to take action would cast an unconscionable financial
burden on the plaintiff in that the plaintiff would have to solicit proxies
from all of the stockholders residing in every State of the Union and
foreign countries. It would involve the conduct of a proxy fight, a proxy
fight which would entail prohibitive expenses and would cause undue loss
of time with the danger that the claims alleged might be barred by the
Statute of Limitations.
222 F. Supp. at 807. The court then ruled that the Massachusetts law was to
be applied; it provides that it "is only when the complaint alleges that the
majority are corrupt or are otherwise incapable of acting in good faith that
the demand upon the body of stockholders may be excused." Id. at 812.
The circuit court reversed on the grounds that the application of the Massachusetts rule "negates the intendment of the act and underestimates the role
to be played by the federal courts in the implementation of national regulatory
legislation." 334 F.2d at 819.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS

In prior decisions, the state and federal courts have construed
the statute where possible and have applied the law of the state
where the transaction arose to fill the interstices; they have not questioned the source of the law applied since there has been no conflict
between federal law and state law.6
In Levitt, the First Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the ruling
of the District Court of Massachusetts which had applied local law
imposing very strict requirements of demand on other shareholders
before bringing a derivative action.' The circuit court said that the
application of Massachusetts law would serve to substantially stiffen
the conditions precedent to bringing suit under the act. This would
contravene the intent of the act which "is directed to 'the national
public interest and the interest of investors * * * adversely affected,'
and its 'purposes * * * with which [its] provisions * * * shall be in-

terpreted, are to mitigate and, so far as is feasible, to eliminate the
conditions enumerated.' "8.
In saying, "we do not see how it can be gainsaid that any substantial stiffening of the conditions precedent to the bringing of
stockholders' suits above normal requirements would conflict with
this broad declaration [of policy]," ' the court established a vague
precedent. Under the Levitt decision, is state law to be adopted as
long as it does not thwart the purposes of the act, or is the vast
repository of the federal common law to be the source of the substantive principles sought? What are the normal requirements of
conditions precedent to bringing a shareholder's derivative suit?
In the past, both state and federal courts have applied state law under
the act, thereby adopting, whether consciously or unconsciously, the
applicable state law as federal law.1" Up to now this has been adeI For examples of the treatment of the act in prior cases, see Taussig v.
Wellington Fund, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 179 (D. Del. 1960), aff'd, 313 F.2d 472

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Acampora v. Birkland, 220

F. Supp. 527 (D. Colo. 1963); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961); Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381
(Del. Ch. 1961); Meiselman v. Eberstadt, 170 A.2d 720 (Del. Ch. 1961).
' See note 5 supra. The Massachusetts rule as construed by the district
court, 222 F. Supp. at 812, is not a majority rule, if it is followed by any
other jurisdiction at all. For a discussion of the function of demand on shareholders and directors, and the status of the state law in regard to demand,
see Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746 (1960); Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 71

(1958).

8334 F.2d at 819, quoting 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1958).
'334 F.2d at 819. (Emphasis added.)
10 See note 6 supra.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

quate. In Levitt, however, at least one exception has arisen to the
blanket adoption of state law, bringing the validity of that practice
up for review. The following will be an attempt to evaluate the
merits of the approaches available, and to determine which approach
should be followed.
Some state11 and circuit court 12 decisions have interpreted the
act to give a private right of action by way of a derivative suit,13
and the courts in Levitt accepted that premise.' 4 But that issue has
not been passed upon by the United States Supreme Court, 1 and
if certiorari is granted in this case,'" it will certainly be a key issue.
No attempt is made to discuss the merits of this issue, and for the
purposes of this note, the assumption is made that there is at least
a derivative right of action by shareholders under the statute.'
It should be noted at the outset that the Erie" rule is not directly
applicable 9 in Levitt because jurisdiction is not based on diversity
of citizenship, but is granted by the act. 20 The court must construe
the act to determine the rights of the parties, making this a federal
" Lutz v. Boas, 171 A.2d 381 (Del. Ch. 1961).
" Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961).

" See 54 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. 80a-43 (1958). This section gives

concurrent jurisdiction to state and federal courts of all suits in equity and
actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the act.

This lends weight to the idea that the intention was to give a private right of
action, but one decision, Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th
Cir. 1961), dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962), has specifically denied
any private right under the act. See also Eisenberg & Phillips, Mutuiat

Fund Litigation-New Frontiers of the Investment Company Act, 62 CoLum.
L. REv. 72, 91 (1962) ; Note, 1961 DuxE B.J. 421.
1 222 F. Supp. at 807.
"Of the recent cases, Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961),
was not appealed, and Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir.
1961), was dismissed as moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962).
1 Petition for cert. filed, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3123
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1964)

(No. 559).

• See note 13 supra.
'SErie
R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case established
that in diversity of citizenship cases, the law of the state in which the suit
arises is to be applied. The case has undergone some redefining. Byrd v.
Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But the general proposition still
applies.
" For discussion of Erie rationale in non-diversity litigation, see Hill,
State ProceduralLaw in Federal Non-diversity Litigation, 69 HARv. L. Rv.
66 (1955); Mishkin, The Variousness of Federal Law, 105 U. PA. L. Rtv.
797 (1957).
054 Stat. 844 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1958).
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question case, in which federal, not state law is applied. 2 A problem
immediately arises because there are no decisions in the federal courts
to determine the substantive rights in a derivative suit under this
statute. Therefore, the decisions as to the law to be adopted under
the act is a policy decision based upon principles of congressional
intent, convenience and certainty of administration, and a proper
deference to state substantive principles.
The court of appeals was correct in reversing the adoption of
state law by the district court if it conflicted with the intention of the
statute. In federal question cases, the federal court may adopt
state law to fill the interstices, but they are not required to do so if
it is against reason or federal policy, and especially if it would
substantially negate the intendment of the act."
Where implementation of the statute is not definitely prescribed
in the statute, the procedure of the federal and state courts of adopting the state law enforcing rights under the statute has advantages
of relative simplicity of administration and relative certainty of
result. By adopting state law, the courts have a more or less established body of law on which to draw, but in applying federal law
not based on the law of the state of jurisdiction, they must look to
the federal common law.2 3 If there are no prior decisions in point,
the end result is based on the declaration of policy in the statute,
a judge's interpretation of legislative intent, uncertain analogies, and
a declaration of what the "general" law is. In such cases the decision
may be just, but with all the undecided variables, an educated guess
of what the outcome will be is nearly impossible.
Added to simplicity of administration and certainty of result,
the adoption of state law would be in line with the idea of recognizing state sovereignty and maximum deference to state substantive
law as in the rationale of Erie and its successors. 24
Additional factors to be considered are the diversity of the law
1, Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also
I BARRON & HoLTZoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 25 (Wright
ed. 1960); WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (1963).
"2Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, supra note 21, at 367; Board of
County Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939). See
also Mishkin, supra note 19, at 802.
"sThe federal common law is that body of law that is built from construction of the Constitution, legislation, or treaties of the United States.
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 471-72
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring).
" See Hill, supra note 19, at 71; Mishkin, supra note 19, at 810.
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from state to state, the number of states that have settled the issue,
and whether or not the state law serves the purpose of the act. If
the law is uniform and well settled in most states there is no real
problem, since results would be predictable and uniform whether
the court adopted state law or established a uniform federal common
law based on the aggregate of the state laws. As the state laws become more diverse, the argument for predictability would support
the application of state law while that for uniformity would not.
Where few states have settled the issue, the argument for uniformity
becomes stronger. There is very little uniformity in the requirements for demand on shareholders." This might indicate that there
is need for a uniform rule, but it also shows that there is little uniformity from which the courts can derive such a rule. It would
seem obvious that so long as federal legislation is being construed,
any state rule that negated the purpose of this act could not be applied.
As intimated above, and as the holding of Levitt points out,
the state law cannot be adopted in federal question cases where its
application would clearly block the purposes of the statute. Assuming, but not yet admitting, that the adoption of the state law is the
correct policy, this restriction must be added to it. In simplest
terms, this policy would be that state law is to be adopted as far as it
does not thwart the purposes of the statute. All the preceding considerations for and against the application of state law apply, but
here an additional problem arises. This problem is how to determine
just what state law serves the purposes of the statute, and what
impedes it.
In the context of Levitt, the district court determined that demand on 48,000 shareholders was not to be excused, even where their
identity was subject to frequent change and they were spread all over
the United States and foreign countries, and which demand would
result in an extremely expensive proxy fight. Is the act thwarted by
this rule? Such a requirement in practice would certainly prevent
shareholders from going to the expense and trouble of trying to
enforce compliance with the fiduciary standards imposed on directors
by the act. Accepting the premise that a private right of action is
authorized, and that the intent of the act is to impose a more stringent regulation over directors' actions than under common law,
" See Note, 73 HARV. L. REv. 746, 747 (1960).
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then it would certainly appear that the Massachusetts rule would
severely limit the purpose of the act.
All conditions precedent to bringing a derivative suit more or
less restrict its availability. It is considered an extraordinary remedy
in that all intra-corporate remedies should first be exhausted; hence
the requirement of demand on directors and shareholders to bring
suit.6-

Levitt recognized the value of these restrictions by saying

that normal requirements of derivative suits do not thwart the act."
It is submitted that another factor, admittedly no less vague yet
distinguishable, is that the requirement must be a reasonable one.
A normal requirement is probably one that is generally accepted
among the states, whereas an unreasonable requirement would be
one that, in the light of modern corporate practice, the number of
shareholders, the evil sought to be corrected, and the validity of the
suit, is prohibitive beyond its usefulness in preventing frivolous or
strike suits. Some states require a bond by the plaintiff in a derivative suit to prevent frivolous or strike suits. It is submitted that
such a requirement is reasonable and normal within the meaning
of Levitt.
There is serious disagreement among states as to what are conditions precedent for bringing derivative suits, and what constitutes
an adequate excuse for failure to perform them.2 1 It would be useless to speculate as to each requirement, but it is submitted that if the
principle under discussion is the one to be accepted by the courts,
only the most restrictive and unreasonable would not be normal
requirements under the act, especially in light of the fact that the
right to bring a private suit under the act is still arguable.2 9 Obviously legislative intent does not show on the face of the act so
plainly that it can be said that any restriction on bringing suit under
the act contravenes its intent. Absent a broader and more authoritative declaration of policy under the act, it is submitted that Levitt
should not be extended to any great degree, if at all, beyond its facts.
" Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1881). See Note, 73 HARv. L. Rv.
746,27 748
(1960).
334 F.2d at 819.
28 See Note, 73 HARv. L. Rxv. 746, 754 (1960).
2' If it is not evident from the act that there is a private right, it follows
that it is not evident that all restrictions on bringing derivative suits are to
be abolished. Accepting the premise that there is a private right, however,
it is only logical that very restrictive conditions that amount to a denial of
that right should not be applied.
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Absent a change in policy brought about by the Supreme Court
or by remedial legislation, convenience and the weight of authority
will probably perpetuate the principle that the courts will adopt the
state conditions precedent for derivative suits brought under the act
unless they impose serious restrictions. Nevertheless, it may be
helpful to mention the other possible approaches.
Theoretically, the courts could accept the policy of adopting
those requirements for derivative suits that are common practice
among the states and that would not defeat the act. This is the
federal common law approach. Comparing this policy with that of
adopting state law except where it negates the purpose of the act,
the body of the common law would be built up from case to case
throughout all jurisdictions; and a case in one jurisdiction establishing a substantive principle would be strong authority in another
jurisdiction. But where the existing state law is adopted, the effect
is to subtract the necessary exceptions from the existing law; and
only those exceptions to state law would be authority from one
jurisdiction to another. It is clear that the better policy for the sake
of certainty and convenience of administration would be to adopt
the state law except where it thwarts the purpose of the act, rather
than to attempt to build a substantive federal common law of requirements for bringing a derivative suit.
In spite of the foregoing argument, there are cogent and selfevident reasons 3° for having a uniform national policy of admin"0Uniformity under a federal statute is usually desirable so that results
will not vary with the accident of jurisdiction. However, by application of
state derivative requirements, it does not seem that the results will vary significantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction although the plaintiff may be
faced with different qualifying requirements before bringing a derivative
suit. As seen in Levitt, if these requirements are not normal or reasonable
as suggested by this note, then the court may strike the offensive requirement. Once past the requirements to get into court by way of a derivative
suit, the construction of the statute as to the merits of the claim undoubtedly
should be derived from a judicially declared uniform federal rule. The fact
that Levitt is the first case since 1940 to raise the question of whether state
law of conditions precedent is to be applied shows that there is no pressing
need for a uniform policy covering this essentially procedural question, since
the application of state law has been sufficient in the past and has adequately
served to qualify shareholders to bring a derivative suit.
The adoption of state law in this instance is not primarily to protect state
sovereignty or a state interest, because the states probably do not have an
interest in securities regulation that is separate from or paramount to the
federal interest. The reason for adopting the state law is simply that there
is a body of law on which to draw that serves the purpose of the act except
in certain limited situations, such as the one in Levitt.
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istration under the Investment Company Act; but unless the policy
is created fully formed, the uncertainties during the growth period
outweigh the arguments for uniformity. An extensive and definitive
statement of policy from the Supreme Court could alleviate much
of the uncertainty; but it does not seem that this is the function of
the Court, notwithstanding the recent decision of J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak.3" Judicial legislation of this degree should be avoided,
especially when there is a reasonable alternative. It is suggested that
there is a reasonable alternative in the continuation of the policy
of adopting state law, thereby confining the power of the Court to a
declaration of policy of what substantive principles thwart the purpose of the act.
The acceptable means for creating this uniform or certain policy
is by legislation. 2 If Congress decides that a private right of action
was intended or is needed, that could be specifically stated and the
means established by which it is to be asserted. Congress could say
that the shareholder has only a derivative right of action, or that
he has a direct right, or both. It could then establish the law or
specify that the state law be applied. This would be the ideal solution to the problem, but it is unlikely that this will come about until
the law becomes hopelessly muddled or Congress decides that the
act, as interpreted by the courts, does not accomplish its purpose.
The Supreme Court could close out all speculation by declaring
that there is to be no private right of action. This cannot be relied
As an argument for the adoption of a uniform judge-made policy, the
argument in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957),
is persuasive; but it is not compelling because the need for a uniform federal
policy of conditions precedent for a derivative suit under the Investment
Company Act is not as pressing as that needed to be filled under the TaftHartley Act, § 301(a). Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958). As a practical matter, it is doubtful
whether the question decided in Levitt will arise again outside Massachusetts.
Accordingly, the opportunity to build a reliable body of judge-made law will
probably not present itself, thus leaving the state of the law in limbo.
s 377 U.S. 426 (1964). The Court in this case gave a direct private right
of action under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(a), 48 Stat.
895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (a) (1958). The act had not provided for one.
The Court said that it had the power to effectuate the purposes of the act
where Congress had not specifically done so.
. Congress at least has a hint that the act has not curbed the abuses at
which it was aimed, and it authorized a study of the effect of the act.
Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, A Study of Mutual Funds, H.R.
Doc. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962).
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upon any more than Congressional clarification. Accordingly,
lawyers and judges must live with the situation as it stands.
The most probable and under the circumstances the most reasonable approach is that taken by Levitt and the previous decisions under
the act. That approach is to adopt the law of the state in its entirety,
except where the requirement for demand on shareholders or other
conditions precedent to bringing of the derivative suit so seriously
and unreasonably burden the shareholder as to prevent him from
bringing an otherwise bona fide suit under the act.
Following this rationale, Levitt will probably have very little
effect outside of Massachusetts, but it will have a substantial effect
in Massachusetts, the home of many investment companies. The
effect will be to make the Investment Company Act available to
shareholders who wish to attempt to enforce its provisions against
directors without having to make a demand on the multitude of
shareholders who are generally not interested in the internal operation of the company.
WILLIAM H. CANNON
Procedural Rules-Emergency--Judge's Discretion
The recent case of Application of President & Directors of
Georgetown College, Inc.' tests the powers of a judge to violate
usual procedural rules in an emergency situation. A patient, who had
voluntarily submitted herself for treatment at Georgetown Hospital,
refused to authorize blood transfusions which the doctors believed
necessary to save her life. After the patient's husband had also refused to authorize the transfusions, the hospital's attorneys presented to a federal district judge an order authorizing transfusions
"necessary to save her life,"2 and requested him to sign it. The
judge denied the order without comment, and the attorneys then
orally petitioned a single judge of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals, Judge Skelly Wright, in chambers to sign the order.
Judge Wright went to the hospital, talked with the patient and her
husband, and discovered them adamant in their conviction that blood
transfusions amount to "drinking blood," a practice strongly condened by their religious sect, the Jehovah's Witnesses. He advised
the patient's husband to obtain counsel, but after making a telephone
1331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
2

Id. at 1001 n.1.

